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INTRODUCTION
THE SUBJECT WHICH I HAVE CHOSEN for this lecture is undoubtedly more appropriate for Bowley than for Walras. Sir Arthur Bowley was a pioneer in the measurement of poverty in Britain, notably in bringing statistical rigor to bear on this important but emotive topic. Seventy years ago he produced, with Burnett-Hurst, a book Livelihood and Poverty (1915), which studied the incidence of poverty in five English towns. Ten years later, with Hogg, he produced a sequel called Has Poverty Diminished? (1925), examining the changes which had taken place in the intervening period.
The changing extent of poverty is a subject of importance today. Many people are concerned that recession, and conservative government policy, have led to an increase in poverty; and the official statistics provide grounds for this fear. In Britain, government figures (Department of Health and Social Security, 1983) show that the proportion of families with incomes below the supplementary benefit level increased by around a quarter between 1979 and 1981, the most recent year available. In the United States, the official estimates (U.S. Bureau For this reason, I was tempted to echo Bowley and title this Lecture Has Poverty Increased ? However, I have not done so, since the content is methodological rather than substantive. It does not seek to provide a definitive answer to the question as to whether poverty has increased; rather it explores some of the problems which arise in trying to provide such an answer. There are many more such problems than can be considered in the space available, and I concentrate on three. (In Atkinson (1985) I have discussed some of the other issues which arise, including the dynamic aspects of poverty and the choice of unit of analysisindividual, family, or household).
First, there is the choice of poverty line-clearly an essential ingredient. It has been recognized since the early days that there is room for differences of view as to the drawing of the line. Those sceptical as to the conclusion that poverty has increased may therefore argue that the choice of a different standard could lead to a reversal of the conclusion.
Secondly, there is the choice of poverty measure. I have simply referred to the proportion of the population in poverty, commonly known as the head count, but there has been an extensive recent literature on alternative poverty measures.
Could different views about the choice of poverty measure lead us to reach different conclusions about what has happened?
Thirdly, sceptics have been heard to complain that those concerned about poverty are really confusing poverty and inequality. Are the numbers quoted for the U.K. and the U.S. just an alternative measure of income inequality? Here, the sceptics are touching on a raw nerve, since in my view the literature on the measurement of poverty has done little to illuminate the relationship between the two concepts.
Before considering these questions, I should draw attention to one theme that recurs throughout the lecture: that there is likely to be a diversity of judgments affecting all aspects of measuring poverty and that we should recognize this explicitly in the procedures we adopt. This will lead to less all-embracing answers. We may only be able to make comparisons and not to measure differences; and our comparisons may lead only to a partial rather than a complete ordering. But such partial answers are better than no answers. In this, and other aspects, I should acknowledge the influence of the work of Amartya Sen. In particular, he has stressed "the danger of falling prey to a kind of nihilism [which] takes the form of noting, quite legitimately, a difficulty of some sort, and then constructing from it a picture of total disaster" (1973, p. 78). So that while I shall be taking seriously the objections raised by the sceptics, my emphasis will be on what we can say.
LEVEL OF THE POVERTY LINE
Beginning with the first question, it is evident that the choice of the poverty line, denoted here by Z, is a matter about which views may differ. Of this, early investigators such as Bowley were well aware. He referred to his poverty line as "arbitrary, but intelligible" (1925, p. 14), recognizing that others might disagree, as illustrated by the famous occasion in 1920 when he was being cross-examined by Ernest Bevin, the well-known union leader (later Foreign Secretary) during the inquiry into dock workers' pay. Bowley had given evidence for the employers as to what constituted a minimum basket of goods. Bevin in turn had gone out and bought the recommended diet and came into court with a plate bearing a few scraps of bacon, fish, and bread. In a devastating piece of cross-examination, he asked Bowley whether he thought that this was sufficient breakfast for a man who had to carry heavy bags of grain all day.2
In terms of the measurement of poverty there is a straightforward procedure, which has been used implicitly for a long time. If we suppose that the poverty line may vary over a certain range [Z-, Z+], denoted by Z*, then we can examine whether or not we obtain the same ranking for all Z in the range ZV. For the head count measure, this means comparing over the range Z* the cumulative distribution, denoted by F(Y), where Y may refer to income or standard of living (for simplicity, I refer to income).
To make this more precise, let us assume that the population is fixed in size, and that F( Y1) = 0 and F( Y2) = 1 for some finite Y1 and Y2; for ease of exposition, I take Y1 = 0 and Y2 = A. The corresponding density function is denoted byf( Y). We are interested in comparing two distributions, F and Fl, denoting the difference by AF F -Fl. The difference in the corresponding densities is denoted by Ab. Then we require a restricted form of first-degree stochastic dominance condition: range of permissible poverty lines extends both above and below the official poverty line (which is the point of intersection in this case). The same can be done for other poverty measures, such as the poverty deficit, normalized by the poverty line. This is the measure D in Table I , which shows a variety of different poverty measures. Again let us suppose that there is a range Z* over which Z may vary. What we then require for agreement that poverty has decreased, or is not higher, is that D be everywhere no higher for all Z in the range ZV. As noted by Foster and Shorrocks (1984) , this is equivalent to a second-degree stochastic dominance condition, although it is important to specify the range over which it must hold. It is a restricted second-degree dominance Before going on to the choice of poverty measure, it should be noted that in Condition I and II families have been assumed to be identical in their needs and the poverty line has been taken as the same for all. In practice, the poverty line is different for families of different size and differing in other respects. There is therefore scope for disagreement not just about the level of the poverty line but also about its structure. The sceptic may point to the widely varying equivalence scales which are employed and to the possibility that these may give conflicting results. Moreover, differing weights are used in combining the poverty indices for different groups to arrive at an aggregate measure. Sometimes the total number of families is counted; in other cases it is the total number of people in poverty. However, all is not lost, since again we may seek a partial ordering. Suppose that we can agree on a ranking of the "needs" of different types of family such that the poverty line is at least no lower as we move up the ranking: couples should get no less than single persons, couples with 1 child no less than couples without children, and so on. Suppose that the same applies to the weights in the aggregate poverty index. Families then differ in two dimensions-income and "needs"-and we can use the results for bi-variate stochastic dominance, applied to income inequality measurement in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1984) . In the case of the poverty deficit, this leads to conditions for dominance which are quite demanding but which are easy to check. In effect, they involve cumulating not just over incomes but also in the second direction of differences in "needs" (Atkinson, 1987) . And where there is only incomplete agreement on the ranking of "needs," the conditions may be applied for the alternative rankings.
DIFFERENT MEASURES OF POVERTY
The head count measure, H, used at the outset has been under severe attack. Some twenty years ago, Watts noted that it had "little but its simplicity to recommend it" (1968, p. 326). In his influential work, Sen has remarked that the degree of support commanded by this measure is "quite astonishing" (1979, p. We assume that p is nondecreasing in Y, which implies that p( Y, Z) is nonpositive. Writing the objective in this way puts it in a form similar to a social welfare function-an aspect developed in the final section of the lecture-and means that an increase in G is preferred. Of course, the assumption that the index may be written in this way is restrictive; it excludes for example the index proposed by Sen (1976a) . It does however encompass a variety of measures, including all of those shown in Table I Sen, on the other hand, took an axiomatic approach and this has been followed in a number of subsequent articles. In the construction of his index, the key axiom is one which rejects the equal weighting of poverty gaps implied by the poverty deficit (the linearity of the p function), on the grounds that this is insensitive to the distribution of income amongst the poor, and proposes that the poverty gap be weighted by the person's rank in the ordering of the poor. Sen refers to the classic use by Borda of such an equidistance cardinalization of an ordering and to a subjective concern of the poor for their relative position. In my own judgment, the arguments about relative position and ranking are more persuasive for inequality measurement (as in Sen, 1974 ) than for poverty measurement-a point to which I return.
There is yet another approach which has not been much followed in the literature (the closest that I have seen is Gourieroux, 1980). This approach considers a class of poverty measures satisfying certain general properties and seeks conditions under which all members of that class will give the same ranking. It tries to establish common ground, so that we may be able to say that poverty has increased, or decreased, for all poverty measures in a class.
To this end, let us consider the difference in poverty as measured by the class of poverty measures which can be written in the form (2) It is clearly not sufficient that AP(Z)< 0 for all Z c Z*. On the other hand, we now have an unambiguous relation between the first-degree and second-degree dominance conditions. Condition IIA is implied by, but does not imply, Condition IA, so that the second-degree condition is clearly weaker. As we have seen, a second-degree dominance condition is not strong enough to ensure the same ranking by the headcount. What makes the second-degree condition sufficient is that we are willing to assume that p is concave in income The advantage of assuming the Dalton transfer principle to hold is that we may use Condition IIA, in which case the implications that can be drawn from the poverty deficit curve are much more far-reaching than at first appeared. If the curves do not cross before Z+, then all of the measures in the Foster et al. class with a > 1, including of course the poverty gap itself, will give the same ranking, as will all measures in the class proposed by Clark et al. What is more, the result can be strengthened to include measures which are s-concave but not necessarily additively separable, such as the variation on the Sen index proposed by Thon (1979) , where the weight attached to the poverty gaps is the ranking in the whole population and not just that among the poor. The result may be extended to third (and higher) degrees of stochastic dominance.
The choice of poverty line and the choice of poverty measure have been discussed separately, but it is evident from consideration of Conditions I, IA, The first view, (A), is that of people who attach no specific weight to poverty, being concerned solely with inequality. If poverty is singled out, then it is simply as a component of social welfare assessment. So that one could adopt a logarithmic social welfare function and decompose the inequality into that due to people having incomes below Z and other components. In this way, the Watts measure of poverty would enter, but only as an interpretation of part of the measured inequality. Such a decomposition into a "poverty effect" and an "affluence effect" was indeed discussed by Watts (1968) , and is explored by Pyatt (1984) , who provides an interesting geometric representation in the case of the Gini coefficient. It should be observed that in such a decompostion the functional form for the poverty component is the same as that for the inequality index.
If, on view (A) the measurement of inequality were to be based on the Rawlsian difference principle (Rawls, 1971) , then this might appear to focus attention on the poor. We have however to be careful. The Rawlsian difference principle has usually been presented by economists, myself included, as maximizing the welfare of the least advantaged individual; and this objective is in no way related to a particular income level. Poverty as such has no role. It would be of no significance that people had more or less than Z. All that would matter would be their rank order.
There is, however, more to a Rawlsian theory of poverty than this, although Rawl's own discussion is not explicit (and, incidentally, the word "poverty" does not appear in his extensive index). To begin with, the popular interpretation in terms of literally the worst off person is not that which Rawls advocates. He sees his difference principle as concerned with a least fortunate group, which in his brief discussion he suggests might be unskilled workers or, alternatively, those "with less than half of the median income and wealth" (1971, p. 98). Some degree of aggregation over individuals is involved, and the definition of this group may give a role to the poverty line (like half of median income).
Perhaps more importantly, we have to remember that the difference principle is the second of Rawls' two principles, and that concern for poverty may enter through the first of his principles, that which gives priority to basic liberties. It can be argued that these liberties, which include participation in society, are dependent on a specified level of income. This is an approach which has been developed by Barry in terms of "effective liberty", the idea being that liberty cannot be enjoyed "unless people reach some necessary level of wealth" (1973, p. 77). This provides one justification for the second view, (B), of the relation between poverty and inequality. This is that we have a lexicographic approach, where avoiding poverty has priority in assuring effective liberty, but inequality enters the assessment as a second concern. In this case, there is no reason why the functional form of P should be related to that of L It would be quite consistent to use the head count for P and a measure satisfying the transfer principle for L In considering the remaining two approaches, it may be useful to think of the assessment of social welfare as involving two stages. First, there is the identification of a particular level of income as being below the poverty line and the evaluation of the costs associated with this deprivation. Second, there is the aggregation across individuals to arrive at an overall social judgment. Again it may be helpful to draw on the analogy with risk analysis. In the work cited earlier, Fishburn (1977) I should like to end with three concluding reflections, prompted in part by reading Bowley's earlier work to which I referred at the outset. First, Bowley asked the question-has poverty diminished?-and concluded that in general it had. I have not attempted to present substantive results here, but the substantive question is an important one and it is a sad commentary on events that the possibility of poverty increasing is one that has to be taken seriously.
The second reflection concerns the presentation of results. I referred earlier to Bowley's encounter with Ernest Bevin. Bevin's biographer comments that "Photographs of the meagre portions of food appeared in half a dozen newspapers over the caption 'A Docker's Breakfast'. They were worth volumes of statistics in their effect on public opinion" (Bullock, 1960, p. 128). It seems to me that there are lessons here. In this field in particular, economists have remained wedded to volumes of statistics as a means of presenting results and have not been very creative in seeking alternatives. Indeed, since most of the work on poverty is now secondary analysis, we do not even have the case studies which increased the impact of the early research of Bowley and others.
What could we do to enliven the material and improve the effectiveness of communication? One suggestion being pursued at the L.S.E. is to exploit the capacities of micro-computers not just in carrying out research but also in its presentation. Rather than supplying the users with tables, what can be done in this and other fields (such as tax reform analysis) is to supply a disk with data and programs for analysis. These programs contain quite a lot of structure, for example making use of dominance results where appropriate, but they also have the great merit of allowing user participation in the design of the results. The users can specify their own poverty standards, choose their own poverty measures, and look at the position of individual families (suitably anonymized). In this way, the analysis is both more flexible and more immediate.
Finally, I cannot help reflecting that the questions discussed in this WalrasBowley Lecture are ones which did not apparently greatly concern Bowley himself, or other pioneers in the field. In retrospect, this was unfortunate, since important conceptual issues in the measurement of poverty remained undiscussed for too long. What was needed was a greater degree of vertical integration between the statistical measurement of poverty on the one hand and welfare economics on the other. One of the great merits of the Econometric Society is that it brings together these two concerns and I hope that the present lecture too has made a contribution to such integration. 
